Speech by Professor Jacqueline McGlade at Arctic Frontiers
Conference, Tromsø, 23 January 2007
Professor Jacqueline McGlade
Executive Director, European Environment Agency
Arctic Frontiers Conference, Tromsø
23 January 2007 - Introductory Remarks - On behalf of the
European Environment Agency I am delighted to have this
opportunity to contribute to your discussions on the Arctic,
in particular the environmental challenges that face the
region, and to offer some views on how to move from analysis
to action in the future.
I will begin by highlighting the main environmental issues
as highlighted by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme,
and in the EEA/UNEP joint report, and then go on to examine
questions about environmental security, existing legal regimes
and governance in an attempt to answer the question - who
is responsible for the Arctic?
Key environmental issues of concern in the Arctic
A great deal of attention in the media and within political
circles is currently devoted to addressing climate change.
Recently, this has been translated into articles in the
press on the consequences of rapid changes in both polar
regions over the coming decades, and the effects of these
changes on the rest of the planet. Some of the changes cited
in the Arctic include the reduction of sea-ice thickness
and extent over the coming decades, the melting and loss
of the Greenland ice sheet and the impact on sea levels,
the freshening of water in the marine environment, changes
in rainfall and an increase in the frequency, intensity
and duration of extreme meteorological events, the acidification
of the oceans through changes in atmospheric carbon dioxide
and sea temperature, the loss of carbon draw down in the
oceans because of the subsequent changes in the ability
of key plankton to form shells, the release of methane through
melting of the permafrost, and overall structural changes
in the Arctic ecosystem due to changes in ocean temperature
and irradiance during the summer months.
It has been also been noted that although the Arctic’s
unique nature is relatively undisturbed, there are growing
signs of threats that could potentially destabilise the
sustainable utilisation by indigenous peoples. Amongst the
threats are the changes caused by industrial activities
and infrastructure developments in the region and their
associated impacts on the distribution, health and availability
of wildlife resources. The strategic importance of the Arctic
Ocean and its neighbouring seas also means that there are
likely to be increased pressures and the potential for accidental
pollution through an increased volume of maritime transport.
More worrying, are the inequalities that have built up in
the distribution of economic benefits arising from the exploitation
of natural resources, with industrialised countries outside
the Arctic being the primary beneficiaries of Arctic resources.
Other threats include the overexploitation or damage to
natural resources: for example the over-harvesting of certain
key fish stocks, the mismanagement of areas of Arctic forest
and unsustainable logging practices, the severe pollution
from mining activities and metal ore processing plants that
has laid waste to taiga and tundra, and the impacts of infrastructure
developments and operational accidents in the oil and gas
sector on land fragmentation, reindeer husbandry, biodiversity,
and the overall quality of surface and marine waters.
Europe is known to be a significant source of pollutants
in the Arctic, contaminating the region via long-range air
and water transport. The pollutants include heavy metals
and organic chemicals, which do not breakdown easily in
the environment, and volatile persistent organic pollutants
and mercury, which are deposited in the Arctic via condensation
from cold air masses and photochemical reactions. Many persistent
organic pollutants are now found concentrated in the fatty
tissues of animals that indigenous peoples rely on for food,
with the result that the Inuit peoples of Greenland and
Canada have some of the highest exposures to mercury and
POPs in the world. New contaminants – e.g. flame retardants-
are also being detected in the Arctic, with unknown health
effects. European nuclear reprocessing plants are the second
largest source of historical radioactive contamination in
the Arctic. There are also numerous military and civilian
nuclear installations and equipment in the Arctic that pose
a risk of large scale air-borne contamination.
But perhaps the greatest challenge facing the Arctic is
how to reconcile the rapidly increasing number of demands
for resources in a way that respects the democratic processes
of individual nation states but at the same time does not
compromise the future of indigenous peoples and others living
in the region. From work undertaken by the EEA on future
scenarios, it is clear that dealing with the range of problems
and demands in a piecemeal fashion is likely to lead to
conflicts and a loss of peace and security.
Environmental security the Arctic?
Environmental security is widely accepted to mean that
the basic needs of life can be sustained from the environment.
Today, long after the cold war has died down, the Arctic
differs geopolitically from other international regions
such as the Middle East or Southeast Asia. The main reason
is that the circumpolar north is made up of peripheral parts
of a number of states whose centres of gravity in political
terms lie in capitals located well to the south. Moscow
has exercised control over the Russian North, Copenhagen
has ruled Greenland, Ottawa has governed the Canadian arctic,
and Washington has made policy decisions about Alaska. As
a result, most Arctic issues have long been treated as peripheral
to national priorities and so it is worth examining whether
environmental security can be truly secured given this context.
The circumpolar region has not necessarily fared badly
through this arrangement; indeed the level of benign neglect
that has occurred has probably helped conserve much of the
arctic wilderness. Added to this, is the fact that the Arctic
is the sparsely populated homeland of 10 million indigenous
peoples, each with their own long and complex history and
who are largely preoccupied with their own affairs.
But the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the region
irrevocably. It released a dynamism of enthusiasm to work
co-operatively in the region the, outcome of which has been
a plethora of initiatives from combating radioactive contamination
in northwestern Russia to the creation of regional and local
forms of governance. These have led to an intensification
of east west interactions and a growing sense of independence
from the southern capitals amongst indigenous peoples.
At the start of the twenty-first century, the Arctic has
thus emerged as a region of international significance –
worthy of its own Lonely Planet guide. In effect, this remote
area once the subject of romantic visions of igloos, icebergs
and polar bears has entered the modern world of global commercialism
with its wide range of associations and self-interests.
The Arctic today contains a wide array of neophyte initiatives
and co-operative actions, ranging from experiments with
new systems of land tenure and resource management (e.g.,
co-management arrangements associated with the settlement
of aboriginal land claims), to the devolution of authority
to peripheral areas as in the creation of the North Slope
Borough in Alaska (1972), the Greenland Home Rule (1979),
and the Nunavut Territory in Canada. But it is as yet unclear
if these are sufficient to underpin a coherent approach
for the successful and sustainable governance of the region.
How then do the institutions and legal regimes that already
exist, establish their roles and rules of precedence in
relation to one another and very specifically how can region-wide
bodies such as the Arctic Council play a lead in the future
development of the Arctic? Where should the leadership come
from? And will it ensure environmental security in the Arctic?
Experience tells us that when communities have a shared
mental model of core values and basic principles that define
meaningful goals, it is possible to have both diversity
and decisiveness, leadership and subsidiarity, a short term
perspective that does not compromise the long term, and
self-interests aligned with the common good. Such seemingly
contradictory aspects can be made mutually supportive, but
for the benefits to be secured a set of basic principles
need to be agreed upon that are verifiable, generic, practical
enough for scrutinizing today's situations as well as of
proposed visions and able to be endorsed across cultures.
Is it feasible to have a shared mental model amongst the
Arctic communities?
One obvious model is environmental security, seen here from
the perspective of the indigenous peoples and other dependent
populations living in the Arctic. Given the concerns raised
about climate change, environmental degradation, and inequities
in benefit-sharing, can we be sure of ensuring such a basic
goal? Moreover, should others be included – for example
those who see the Arctic as a global commons and have come
to rely on its resources?
To ensure environmental security, we will also need to
find ways to avoid crisis-generating tipping points and
conflict, characteristic of the ad-hoc approach adopted
in many other parts of the world. We will need to move towards
a situation where we can recognise the very real dangers
of extrapolating today’s situation, where we can plan with
reference to the future rather than the past and treat today’s
investments as a basis for further improvements, where we
can use the economy as a means to reach dignified sustainable
goals for overall well-being and ensure the ecological and
social resilience of the region.
At present, the range and complexity of institutions and
organisations involved in the governance of the Arctic mitigate
against the emergence of such a solution. This is the real
challenge to be faced in the Arctic.
Are legal regimes the solution?
The First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, in 1958,
produced four global conventions – on the high seas, the
territorial sea and the contiguous zone, the continental
shelf, and fishing and conservation of the living resources
of the high seas. By 1982, third UN Conference on the Law
of the Sea had succeeded in producing a comprehensive Convention
covering all segments of the ocean space, codifiying changes
that had occurred in customary international law, most saliently
the right of coastal states to establish 200-mile exclusive
economic zones (EEZ) and specifying rules on a wide range
of uses.
Two dimensions should be kept in mind when examining the
LOSC in the Arctic: the spatial segment, and type of activity.
The general pattern is that the right of coastal states
to set and enforce rules on various activities decreases
with distance from the coastline. With respect to navigation,
due to its global nature, the set of measures that coastal
states can take unilaterally is constrained in the territorial
sea, which may extend 12 miles from the baselines; it is
even further restrained in the EEZ.
A coastal state also enjoys exclusive management authority
over resources found in the continental shelf, including
those parts that extend beyond 200 miles from the baselines.
The resources found on the deep sea bed beyond the continental
are defined as the ‘common heritage of mankind’ and made
subject to a specific regime. Beyond its EEZ and continental
shelf, a coastal state generally has few rights or obligations
that are not also held by others, except that conservation
measures under regional fisheries management regimes on
stocks straddling between an EEZ and the high seas area
are to be compatible with coastal state measures.
Particular rules apply to spatial areas with certain physical
or socio-economic characteristics, such as enclosed or semi-enclosed
seas, or straits used in ice-covered areas. Article 234
on ice-covered areas originated in Canada’s concern with
foreign vessel traffic in the Canadian Arctic, and enables
coastal states to pass and enforce especially strict vessel-source
pollution rules.
In some areas, such as conservation and use of shared fisheries
resources, the Law of the Sea Convention strongly encourages
regional management regimes. Thus, in adopting laws and
regulations to prevent, reduce and control such pollution,
states ‘shall endeavour to harmonize their policies in this
connection at the appropriate regional level’.
In some other issue areas, however, the LOSC restricts
the leeway for regional action, by setting either ‘floors’
or ‘ceilings’ for regional regimes. An important example
of substantive floors, or minimum standards, are the provisions
on dumping. Arctic institutions, especially the Arctic Military
Environmental Cooperation which involves the foreign ministries
of Norway, Russia, the UK and the USA, have played an important
role in improving Russia’s treatment facilities for low-level
waste, thereby enabling it to join a global ban on dumping
of such material. While dumping is subject to minimum requirements,
the LOSC sets maximum standards for rules on other kinds
of vessel pollution by foreign vessels – and those are lower,
the further away from the coastline a vessel operates.
The Law of the Sea Convention entered into force in 1994
and is legally binding on those 149 parties that have ratified
or acceded to the Convention. Included here are all the
Arctic states except the USA. Important parts of the Convention,
including the EEZ concept and the width of the territorial
sea, have now entered into the body of customary law and
are therefore binding on all states whether or not they
have joined the Convention. The net result has been a surge
of activity amongst Arctic states to place claims that stretch
to the 0° point on the world.
In addition to the Law of the Sea, member states have separately
and in the case of the European Union, en bloc, entered
into a number of multi-lateral environmental agreements
that are also relevant to the Arctic. These include:
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands
Convention on Biological Diversity
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animal
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
Convention on Long range Transboudary Air Pollution
UNEP Regional Seas programme
Vienna Convention on protection of the Ozone Layer
United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change
Convention on Access tp Information, Public Participation
in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context (Espoo)
Is there a need for a comprehensive and integrated Arctic
regime comparable to the Antarctic Treaty System for the
southern polar region and would the establishment of legally
binding international arrangement substantially improve
conditions likely to secure sustainable development of the
Arctic?
The most likely answer is probably not at this moment in
time. Rather it would be more realistic to propose a protocol
under the LOSC for the Polar Ocean. This would allow concerns
about new shipping routes, new fishing grounds and gas and
oil exploration to be properly addressed. (It is only for
historical reasons that existing regional treaties under
LOSC deals only with fisheries. According to the convention,
any relevant issue can be taken up).
On the other hand the debate about strengthening the multilateral
environmental agreements has gained considerable attention
and support from the Arctic Parliamentarians and the Nordic
Council of Ministers and was discussed in some detail at
a recent meeting in Arendal. The proposal would be to build
in new mechanisms under them – something which again seems
very realistic. There would thus be a need for the Arctic
and Nordic Councils to examine the binding obligations of
the existing MEAs on those states that have ratified them,
the effects on states which have not, their overall compatibility
and in the end whether the various agreements and laws can
be enforced.
Today’s Governance
Even the most cursory examination of today’s organisations
in the circumpolar north shows that the majority are less
than 20 years old. During the course of the twentieth century
three key initiatives stand out, the North Pacific Sealing
Convention aimed at conservation of the northern fur seal
in the Bering Straits and the 1920 Treaty of Spitzbergen,
establishing the Svalbard Archipelago demilitarised regime
under the sovereignty of Norway; and the 1973 Agreement
on the Conservation of Polar Bears and their habitats.
The key circumpolar organisations today include: the Arctic
Council (1996), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (1993);
Indigenous People’s Secretariat (1993); International Arctic
Science Committee (11000); Nordic Council of Ministers (1971);
Northern Forum (1991); Standing Committee of Parliamentarians
of the Arctic Region (1994); UNEP/GRID-Arendal (1989) and
the University of the Arctic (1997). In addition to the
countries of the region, and the European Commission, many
of these organisations include observers from outside the
Arctic.
If we take two key issues –sustainable exploitation of
the marine ecosystem and climate change - how should the
Arctic Council and EU be expected to play out their various
roles in delivering policies for the Arctic in the future?
Integrated management of the marine ecosystem
Internationally, there is a movement through the United
Nations to implement the ecosystem approach to managing
the seas – this is now part of several international treaties.
As we can see from recent analyses, there are limits as
to how much human pressure the Arctic coastal and marine
ecosystems can withstand.
In December 2006 the European Council of Ministers reached
political agreement on a draft directive establishing a
framework for
community action in the field of marine environmental policy.
The draft directive aims to establish a framework to preserve,
prevent the deterioration and restore the marine environment,
through the development by Member States of marine strategies
for marine regions or sub-regions. The objective of the
marine strategies is to achieve good environmental status
in each marine region. Good environmental status means that
seas and oceans are ecologically diverse and dynamic, clean,
healthy and productive, their use is at a sustainable level,
safeguarding the potential for uses and activities by current
and future generations. Marine strategies will be regularly
up-dated and made available to the public according to the
Community legislation.
The legal basis proposed for a Council decision is a qualified
majority where a co-decision procedure with the European
Parliament is applicable. The European Parliament delivered
its first reading opinion in November 2006 in which it agreed
that within two years of coming into force, the Commission
shall report inter alia on the state of the environment
of Arctic waters of importance for the Community and propose
relevant measures with a view to establishing the Arctic
as a protected areas, similar to the Antarctic and designated
as a “natural reserve devoted to peace and science”.
Such measures could also serve as a strong set of proposal
to put within a Polar Ocean protocol and could include joint
mapping, research and monitoring, state of the environment
baseline, protected areas, common standards for petroleum
extraction and moratoria on destructive fishing practices.
An additional EU aspect of governance derives from the
EU Northern Dimension policy, which is the Arctic component
of the sub-regional co-operation within the EU Neighbourhood
Programme, along with the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
Because of the strength of the Nordic member states and
the development banks, a number of projects have gone ahead.
As a result the Northern Dimension Environment Partnership
facility is very effective and receives financial contributions
from the Russian Ministry of Finance. But it is still an
open question as to how this policy will provide a vehicle
to support an annual action programme and how it might facilitate
multilateral collaboration in light of the dominance of
bilateral projects with Russia.
At the same time, the Norwegian and Russian governments
have delivered an important contribution to the future sustainable
use of marine resources through its management plan for
the Barents Sea. The Russians have signaled a strong interest
in having a common Barents Sea approach based on what they
have learned from the Norwegian experience. Concrete projects
have started, including state of the environment indicator
joint monitoring, mapping initiatives e.g. sea birds, vulnerability
analyses and exchange of experience of regulatory measures
for the oil and gas sector. The approach here could be an
important element for the EU when discussing the marine
directive as the basic principles are the same. And the
Norwegian chairmanship in the Arctic Council has put forward
integrated marine management as one of its first priorities.
So here we can see a strong potential for a common set of
views and policies to emerge.
Climate change
Climate change is an even more controversial area, given
the countries of the Arctic, to consider.
As Chair of the Arctic Council, Norway has a crucial role
in creating the political will needed to mitigate the effects
of global warming – crucial to future of the Arctic. The
country is the third largest petroleum exporter in the world
– and a key player in the discussions on energy security.
In recent days Norway has pledged to provide Europe with
secure energy supplies in light of the difficulties in securing
stability of supply from Russia, Statoil and ipso facto
Norway will significantly increase its production through
expansion of its offshore activities by extending north
of Norway towards the border with Russia in the Barents
Sea. This is in a disputed area – one that is equivalent
to the Norwegian area of the North Sea and which according
to the Norwegian pertroleum directorate could contain 29%
of all undiscovered resources.
Norway has earned more than 4000 billion NoK since 1970,
selling the products that create greenhouse gases when burned
in other nations. Norwegian discharges of climate gases
are almost 10% above its Kyoto target, and are projected
to rise even more, with no national plan as to how to reduce
emissions.
International climate negotiations are being taken up by
the UN, to see if clear agreements can be achieved for the
post-2012 world of the actions that will be taken. But in
the meantime, there is a need for the majority of Arctic
states that are signatories to Kyoto to fulfill their obligations
under the treaty.
This is the rationale behind the recent initiative from
the EU Commission to unilaterally cut GHG emissions by 20%
in 2020. If other industrialised nations follow, the EU
will cut its emissions by 30%- an objective the Union will
pursue in international negotiations as it sees this as
necessary to avoid a global temperature increase above 2
°C, which is assumed a limit to avoid catastrophic detrimental
effects e.g. from melting of the Arctic ice.
Politically, such reductions in industrialised countries
are a prerequisite for the developing nations, with fast
growing emitters such as China, India, Brazil and Indonesia,
to join the climate regime. So it will be extremely important
for Norway to carry out its recently stated aim to join
with the EU by matching the targets set out by the Commission
last week in Brussels and by helping to bring new initiatives
to the negotiation table through an effective policy on
domestic GHG reductions thereby moving to a climate friendly
economy. To lead by example in the area of climate change
will be demanding for any country: for Norway and the Arctic
it is crucial.
Conclusions
Although an Arctic treaty is not likely to be feasible
or practical, it is important that the Arctic community
of parliamentarians, scientists, policy makers and communities
press for an internationally agreed approach - a Polar Ocean
protocol under the Law of the Sea Convention - drawing on
the experience from the member states for supplementary
mechanisms and instruments, and supplemented by strengthened
mechanisms for the Arctic within the wide range of multilateral
environmental agreements. Without these in place, it is
inconceivable that the institutions and Arctic states on
their own will be able to withstand the pressure from within
as well as from outside the region to exploit the resources
as they become more accessible or scarcer in other parts
of the world.
In the early stages, Arctic states and indigenous people’s
will need to focus on reducing the impacts of the major
sources of pollution mentioned earlier, preventing a rush
to exploit all the available resources of the Arctic - another
Klondyke – and avoiding the destabilising effects of massive
infrastructure developments. To do this will require that
member states fully implement their obligations under the
wide range of agreements and protocols including LRTAP and
Kyoto.
The Arctic Council made up of its member states is in fact
the only legitimate institution to oversee this process
and must by default assuming a leadership role in this regard.
However, it should also be stressed that the European Union
and especially its Arctic member states have an extra duty
of care – namely to raise awareness of the situation and
issues concerning the Arctic and to gain support in all
the relevant international settings for increased controls
for the protection, conservation and sustainable use of
resources in the Arctic region, building a shared environmental
information system for reporting on the state of the environment
and evaluating the effectiveness of European and key global
environmental policies on the Arctic over the coming decades.
In conclusion then, let me state that the Arctic provides
the industrialised world with a critical chance to put into
practice all the rhetoric of sustainable development, to
move towards a common vision of sharing resources for the
benefit of all the peoples of the region and to showing
leadership and at the same time restraint in terms of the
wise stewardship of the planet’s natural resources. The
challenge now is not to let the opportunity slip away.
Report: Arctic environment: European perspectives
